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The Legislative Upheaval in
Public-Sector Labor Law: A
Search for Common Elements
Martin H. Malin*
I. Introduction
During the winter and spring of 2011, the nation’s eyes were on
Wisconsin as newly-elected Governor Scott Walker introduced a “bud-
get repair bill” that largely eliminated collective bargaining for all
public employees in the state except law enforcement and fire protec-
tion personnel.1 Senate Democrats fled to Illinois, denying the super-
majority quorum needed under state law to consider fiscal legislation.
While the Democrats were still out of the state, the Republicans
stripped out provisions that they believed required the super quorum
and enacted the bill. The controversy produced public demonstrations
on a scale Madison had not seen since the Vietnam War. The Dane
County Circuit Court enjoined the enactment on the ground that the
legislature violated the state’s open meetings law, but in a party-line
four-to-three vote, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed,2 and Act
10 took effect. Before the court’s decision, incumbent Republican
David Prosser won a bitterly close election to retain his seat on the
court.3 The controversy also led to the recall of nine senators, six Re-
publicans and three Democrats, and the ouster of two of the Republi-
cans.4 As this article goes to press, the governor and four additional
Republican state senators have been recalled, with primaries sched-
uled for May 8, 2012, and the final recall election scheduled for June 5,
2012.5
*Professor and Director, Institute for Law and the Workplace, Chicago-Kent Col-
lege of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. The author gratefully acknowledges superb
research assistance from Amanda Clark, Chicago-Kent class of 2012, and financial sup-
port from the Marshall-Ewell Research Fund at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. 2011 Wis. Act 10. Subsequently, the biannual budget enactment exempted
municipal transit employees from Act 10. 2011 Wis. Act. 32.
2. State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 798 N.W.2d 436 (Wis. 2011).
3. See Editorial, Time to Move Past Court Flap: Recount Shows Prosser Beat Klop-
penberg, Who Shouldn’t Drag Her Defeat to the Courts, WIS. ST. J., May 24, 2011, at A13,
available at 2011 WLNR 10397020.
4. See Tom Tolan et al., Democrats Sweep Final Two Recall Elections in Wisconsin,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 17, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 16253442.
5. Recall Election Information, WIS. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY BD., http://gab.wi.gov/
elections-voting/recall (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
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Ohio also saw sizeable demonstrations as the legislature enacted
major changes to the state’s public employee collective bargaining
statute.6 In reaction to the enactment, opponents garnered 1,298,301
signatures to place the enactment on the November 8, 2011 ballot,
more than five times the 231,147 valid signatures required under
state law.7 On November 8, 2011, Ohio voters rejected the enactment
61.59% to 38.41%.8
The upheaval in public-sector labor law, however, was not con-
fined to Ohio and Wisconsin. More than a dozen states amended their
public employee collective bargaining statutes. Some changes were
relatively minor tweaks; some were radical overhauls. In this article,
I review the changes enacted in twelve states: Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Although space limitations preclude
a detailed normative evaluation of these changes, I take the first steps,
placing the twelve states’ actions in the context of the ongoing policy de-
bates over public employee collective bargaining, and identifying com-
mon elements within the upheaval. Detailed normative analysis must
await a subsequent article.
II. The Upheaval in Context
Although private-sector workers have had statutorily protected
rights to organize and bargain collectively for more than three-
quarters of a century,9 comparable rights for public employees have al-
ways been controversial. As late as 1963, the Michigan Supreme Court
upheld a city’s prohibition on its police officers joining a labor union
that admitted to membership any person who was not a member of the
police department.10 Although such prohibitions today would clearly be
unconstitutional infringements on workers’ freedom of association pro-
tected by the First Amendment,11 North Carolina and Virginia continue
to prohibit by statute public employee collective bargaining.12
Recent decades have seen major swings in the pendulum concern-
ing public employee collective bargaining rights. The 1990s were char-
6. S.B. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011).
7. See Laura A. Bischoff, Senate Bill 5 Repeal Effort May Set Record, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, June 30, 2011, at A1, available at 2011 WLNR 13032687.
8. The official vote tally is available at: http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/elections/
Research/electResultsMain/2011results/201108Issue2.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
9. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, 452
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006)).
10. Local No. 201, AFSCME v. City of Muskegon, 120 N.W.2d 197, 203 (Mich.
1963).
11. See, e.g., AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir. 1969); Atkins v.
City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068, 1075 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (three-judge district court).
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-57.2 (2011); see also TEX.
LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 174.023 (West 2011) (prohibiting collective bargaining for local
government employees except by local option for police and firefighters).
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acterized by considerable backlash against public employee collective
bargaining, particularly in public education. In 1994, Michigan, where
John Engler was twice elected governor in part by demonizing the Mi-
chigan Education Association, prohibited bargaining on: the identity
of a school district’s group insurance carrier; the starting day of the
school term; the amount of required pupil contact time; and several
other matters impacting employee working conditions.13 Michigan
also greatly strengthened its prohibition of public employee strikes.14
Oregon amended its public employee collective bargaining statute to
exclude from mandatory bargaining such subjects as class size, the
school calendar, and teacher evaluation criteria.15
In 1993, Wisconsin enacted the qualified economic offer (QEO),
which essentially preempted bargaining over school employee wages
as long as the school district’s wage offer met a prescribed formula.16
Ohio prohibited bargaining on state university faculty workloads.17
The Chicago School Reform Act of 1995 prohibited decision and
impact bargaining in the Chicago Public Schools and the City Colleges
of Chicago on numerous matters that had previously been negotiated,
including: subcontracting; layoffs and reductions in force; and class
size, staffing, and assignment.18 Pennsylvania adopted Act 46 in 1998,
which provided that whenever the Philadelphia school system was
found to be in financial distress, it would not be required to bargain
over, among other matters, subcontracting, reductions in force, the
school calendar, and teacher preparation time.19 The entire NewMexico
Public Employee Labor Relations Act sunset in 1999 when a Republican
governor vetoed its extension.20
The first decade of the new century saw the pendulum swing in
the opposite direction. Illinois amended the Chicago School Reform Act
to change the prohibited subjects of bargaining to permissive subjects.21
13. 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 112 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.215
(West 2011)).
14. Id. (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.202 (West 2011)).
15. 1995 Or. Laws ch. 286, S.B. 750 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.650(7)(e)
(West 2011)).
16. 1993 Wis. Act. 16 (codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(1)(nc)). In 2009, Wiscon-
sin repealed the QEO in 2009 Wis. Act 28 (2009 A.B. 75). The text of the Act is available
at: https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2009/related/acts/28.pdf.
17. 1993 Ohio Laws file 30, H.B. 152 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.45
(West 2011)); see Cent. State Univ. v. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124 (1999)
(upholding constitutionality of the prohibition).
18. Ill. Pub. Act 89-15 § 10 (codified at 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4.5 (West 2011)).
19. See David J. Strom & Stephanie S. Baxter, From the Statehouse to the School-
house: How Legislatures and Courts Shaped Labor Relations for Public Education Em-
ployees During the Last Decade, 30 J. L. & EDUC. 275, 295 (2001).
20. See Michael Coleman, Union Suit Against Gov. Rejected, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
July 1, 1999, at A1, available at 1999 WLNR 2354044.
21. Ill. Pub. Act 93-3 § 10 (codified at 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4.5 (West 2011)).
This change became effective April 16, 2003.
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Illinois also imposed first-contract interest arbitration for bargaining
units of thirty-five or fewer employees.22 Wisconsin repealed the QEO,
granted collective bargaining rights to state university faculty and
research assistants, made teacher preparation time and changes to
teacher evaluation plans mandatory subjects of bargaining, and man-
dated that grievance arbitration continue during contract hiatus peri-
ods.23 Illinois, New Jersey, Oregon, New Hampshire, California, and
Massachusetts mandated “card check” recognition.24 Numerous states
extended collective bargaining rights to home health care aides and
in-home daycare providers by designating the state as employer of re-
cord for collective bargaining purposes; otherwise, they would be con-
sidered independent contractors.25 In 2003, New Mexico enacted a
public employee collective bargaining statute that was stronger than
the one that had sunset four years earlier.26 In 2004, Oklahoma ex-
tended collective bargaining rights to employees of municipalities
with populations of 35,000 or more.27 But the pendulum reversed di-
rections again following the 2010 elections.28
22. Ill. Pub. Act 96-598 (codified at 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 315/7 (West 2011)).
23. 2009 Wis. Act 28 (2009 A.B. 75). The text of the Act is available at: https://docs.
legis.wisconsin.gov/2009/related/acts/28.pdf.
24. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 315/9(a-5) (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.1
(West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.682 (West 2011); S.B. 216, 160th Sess. (N.H. 2007)
(enacted), repealed by S.B. 589, 162d Sess. (N.H. 2011); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 71636.3 (West
2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 150A, §§ 2, 5 (West 2011).
25. See generally Peggie R. Smith, The Publicization of Home-Based Care Work in
State Labor Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1390 (2008).
26. 2003 N.M. Laws, H.B. 508 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-1 to -26 (West
2011)).
27. S.B. 1529, 49th Sess. (Okla. 2004), 2004 Okla. Sess. Laws 62 (codified at OKLA.
STAT. §§ 51-200 to 51-220 (West 2011)). Oklahoma repealed these rights in H.B. 1593,
53d Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2011).
28. Interestingly, the pendulum for federal employee collective bargaining has
seemed to go in the opposite direction from state and local government employee bar-
gaining during much of this same period. President Clinton issued Executive Order
12871, which provided for the creation of labor-management partnerships and for execu-
tive branch agencies to negotiate permissive subjects of bargaining. Shortly after taking
office, President Bush revoked Executive Order 12871. President Bush also issued Ex-
ecutive Order 13252, which stripped employees of five sections of the Department of
Justice of collective bargaining rights on national security grounds. The Bush adminis-
tration also forbade collective bargaining for airport screeners employed by the Trans-
portation Security Administration and promulgated regulations severely restricting
collective bargaining for employees of the Departments of Homeland Security and
Defense. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (inva-
lidating DHS regs); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Gates, 486 F.3d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(upholding DoD regs). President Obama has issued Executive Order 13522, which cre-
ated labor-management forums similar to the Clinton labor-management partnerships
and called for demonstration projects where agencies would elect to bargain permissive
subjects. He has also restored collective bargaining rights for airport screeners, who
have voted to be represented by the American Federation of Government Employees. See
Press Release, Fed. Lab. Relations Auth., FLRA Office of General Counsel Announces Re-
sults of TSA Runoff Election (June 23, 2011), http://www.flra.gov/webfm_send1502. Of
course, the pendulum could swing again depending on the outcome of the 2012 elections.
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The arguments against public employee collective bargaining have
not changed much over the decades. In a March 10, 2011 opinion col-
umn in the Wall Street Journal, Wisconsin Governor Walker attacked
collective bargaining agreements for their wage rates, health insurance
and pension provisions, and use of seniority. He compared public em-
ployee health and pension benefits to those of the private sector. He ar-
gued that his budget repair bill would give public employers “the tools
to reward productive workers and improve their operations. Most cru-
cially, our reforms confront the barriers of collective bargaining that
currently block innovation and reform.”29
Governor Walker’s arguments against public employee collective
bargaining can be traced at least as far back as the Boston police
strike in 1919, which resulted in lawlessness for two days in down-
town Boston and “became synonymous with the evils of public sector
unionism.”30 Critics maintain that public-sector collective bargaining
distorts democracy by giving one interest group—public employees
and their unions—an avenue of access to government decisionmakers
that no other group enjoys.31 They further argue that collective bar-
gaining is not conducted at arm’s length because public officials desire
the campaign support of the unions sitting across the bargaining
table. This, critics contend, results in bloated salaries and benefits, ex-
cessive staffing levels, inefficient work rules, job security for poor per-
formers, the absence of merit in employment decisions, and the stifling
of innovation in the delivery of public services.32 These criticisms
fueled the backlash against public employee collective bargaining in
the 1990s and the upheaval of 2011.
III. Searching the Upheaval for Common Elements
This section focuses on changes made by twelve states to public
employee collective bargaining statutes as of August 15, 2011. It in-
cludes Ohio, even though that state’s enactment never took effect,
because the article’s purpose is to identify common elements in the
legislative upheaval resulting from the 2010 elections. Some changes
29. Scott Walker, Op-Ed., Why I’m Fighting in Wisconsin, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 10,
2011, at A17, available at 2010 WLNR 4819853.
30. MARTIN H. MALIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 216
(2d ed. 2011).
31. See, e.g., Daniel DiSalvo, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, NAT’L AFF.,
Fall 2010, at 3, 13; Robert S. Summers, Public Sector Collective Bargaining Substan-
tially Diminishes Democracy, GOV’T UNION REV., Winter 1980, at 5; see also HARRY H.
WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 30 (1971) (“[A] full trans-
plant of collective bargaining … would, in many cases, institutionalize the power of pub-
lic employee unions in a way that would leave competing groups in the political process
at a permanent and substantial disadvantage.”).
32. See, e.g., DiSalvo, supra note 31; Leo Troy, Are Municipal Collective Bargain-
ing and Municipal Governance Compatible?, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 453 (2003); (Gov-
ernment) Workers of the World Unite!, ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2011, at 21.
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resulted from bruising partisan battles. Others resulted from negotia-
tions among interested parties and were adopted unanimously or with
near unanimity, with proponents contrasting the process with the
highly-visible partisan fight in Wisconsin.33 Rather than go through the
changes state-by-state, this section looks at common elements found in
multiple state legislative changes.
A. Repeal of the Right to Bargain
Two states, Oklahoma and Tennessee, repealed statutes that pro-
vided public employees with collective bargaining rights. On April 29,
2011, Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin signed House Bill 1593 repeal-
ing the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act,
which had guaranteed the rights to organize and bargain collectively
to employees of municipalities with populations above 35,000.34 The
repeal leaves the decision to bargain to the municipalities’ discretion.
The repeal’s sponsors argued that it was necessary to restore local con-
trol over the decision to bargain collectively.35 The governor main-
tained that it would control costs.36
Tennessee repealed the Education Professional Negotiations Act,
which had provided teachers with the right to organize and bargain
collectively since 1978, and replaced it with the Professional Educa-
tors Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011.37 The Tennessee Senate
voted to repeal the collective bargaining law, but the state House of
Representatives voted to limit the scope of bargaining rather than
repeal it.38 The following day, a conference committee voted for the
repeal, which passed later that day in both houses.39
33. See Tara Malone, Quinn Signs Education Overhaul Package, CHI. TRIB., June 13,
2011, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chibrknews-quinn-to-sign-
education-overhaul-package-20110613,0,4441949.story (Illinois); Noah Bierman, Pa-
trick, Leaders Strike Deal on Unions, BOS. GLOBE, July 9, 2011, at 1, available at 2011
WLNR 13584108 (Massachusetts); Kevin O’Hanlon, Overhaul on Verge of Passage,
LINCOLN J. STAR, May 21, 2011, at B, available at 2011 WLNR 10259125 (Nebraska).
34. H.B. 1593, 53d Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2011), www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.
aspx?Bill=HB1593&Tab=0.
35. See Barbara Hoberock, Fallin Signs Collective-Bargaining Bill, TULSA WORLD,
Apr. 29, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 8420196 (quoting co-sponsor Representative Steve
Martin); Sean Murphy, Oklahoma Senate Approves Anti-Union Rights Bill, TULSA WORLD,
Apr. 19, 2011, http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=336&articleid=
20110419_336_0_OKLAHO385498 (quoting co-sponsor Senator Cliff Aldridge).
36. Hoberock, supra note 35. Interestingly, the Oklahoma House defeated another
bill, H.B. 1576, which would have amended Oklahoma’s police and firefighter collective
bargaining statute by giving municipalities the option of accepting the award of an inter-
est arbitrator or rejecting it and returning to negotiations. The text of the bill is avail-
able at: http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=hb1576.
37. Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. No. 378 (codified at TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-5-601 (2011)).
38. See Richard Locker, Teacher Bargaining Hinges on GOP, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL,
May 20, 2011, at B1, available at 2011 WLNR 10114880.
39. See Richard Locker, Teachers Rights to Negotiate Repealed—Late House Vote
Kills Collective Bargaining by Teachers, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, May 21, 2011, at A1,
available at 2011 WLNR 10275968. Critics of the repeal charged that it was Republican
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Under the Collaborative Conferencing Act (CCA), between Octo-
ber 1 and November 1, employees may file with the school district a pe-
tition for collaborative conferencing supported by a fifteen percent
showing of interest.40 If this showing is met, the school board must ap-
point a committee with equal representation of board members and
employees to conduct an election whereby employees vote whether to
engage in collaborative conferencing and if so, who shall represent
them. The choices for representation must include “unaffiliated.”41 If
a majority votes for collaborative conferencing, the school board ap-
points a team of between seven and eleven management personnel.
The employees are entitled to an equal number of representatives on
the committee. Each employee representative option that received at
least fifteen percent of the vote is entitled to proportional represen-
tation.42 The committee that conducted the election selects the repre-
sentatives of the unaffiliated employees, if fifteen percent or more of
the employees selected that option.43 The collaborative conferencing
committee remains in effect for three years, after which the election
process is repeated.44
The CCA defines collaborative conferencing as “the process by
which [the parties] meet at reasonable times to confer, consult and dis-
cuss and to exchange information, opinions and proposals on matters
relating to the terms and conditions of professional employee service,
using the principles and techniques of interest-based collaborative
problem-solving.”45 The CCA prohibits refusing or failing to partici-
pate in collaborative conferencing.46 It requires the parties jointly to
prepare a written memorandum of understanding of any agreement
reached, but conditions portions of an agreement requiring funding on
the appropriation of such funding by the relevant authority.47 Further,
it expressly declares that the parties are not required to reach agree-
ment; if no agreement is reached, the school board sets employee
terms and conditions of employment by board policy.48 The CCA also
appears to authorize the director of schools to bypass the employees’
retaliation against the Tennessee Education Association for supporting more Democrats
than Republicans in the 2010 elections, noting that Representative Glen Casada, chair
of the Republican caucus, had asked the union prior to the elections to increase its cam-
paign contributions to Republicans to equal what it was giving to Democrats. Locker,
supra note 38.
40. Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. No. 378 (codified at TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-5-605(b)(1)
(2011)).
41. Id. § 49-5-605(b)(1), (2).
42. Id. § 49-5-605(b)(4).
43. Id. § 49-5-605(b)(5).
44. Id. § 49-5-605(b)(6)(A).
45. Id. § 49-5-602(2).
46. Id. § 49-5-606(a)(3), (b)(2).
47. Id. § 49-5-609(b).
48. Id. § 49-5-609(d).
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representatives and deal directly with individual employees.49 Beyond
these provisions, the CCA is silent as to the content of the duty to en-
gage in collaborative conferencing. Because Tennessee does not have a
labor relations board to administer the CCA, it presumably will be
up to the Tennessee courts to determine the content of the duty and
the extent to which the generally well-defined duty to bargain will be
applied to the duty to engage in collaborative conferencing.
The Tennessee statute mandates collaborative conferencing with
respect to salaries, grievance procedures, insurance, fringe benefits
other than retirement benefits, working conditions, leave, and payroll
deductions.50 It expressly prohibits collaborative conferencing with re-
spect to differential pay plans, incentive compensation, expenditure of
grants or awards, evaluations, staffing decisions, personnel decisions
concerning assignment of professional employees, and payroll deduc-
tions for political activities.51
Several states, while not repealing their public employee collec-
tive bargaining statutes, amended them to deny collective bargaining
rights to certain groups of employees. Nevada took bargaining rights
away from doctors, lawyers, and some supervisors.52 Had voters not
rejected it, the Ohio enactment would have taken bargaining rights
away from university faculty who participate in faculty governance
and certain police and firefighter supervisors.53
Wisconsin Act 10 took away collective bargaining rights from
state university faculty, all employees of the University of Wisconsin
Hospitals and Clinics, and day care and home health care providers.54
Although Act 10 did not repeal the Municipal Employee Relations Act
or the State Employee Relations Act, it effectively abolished collective
bargaining for all public employees except most law enforcement and
fire protection personnel and municipal transit employees if denial of
collective bargaining rights to those transit employees would result in
the municipality losing federal funds.55 It prohibits bargaining on any
49. See id. § 49-5-608(c).
50. Id. § 49-5-608(a).
51. Id. § 49-5-608(b).
52. S.B. 98, §§ 5, 6, 76th Leg. (Nev. 2011) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.140
(2011)).
53. S.B. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4117.01(K); (C)(10); (F)(2).
54. 2011 Wis. Act 10 §§ 265 (state university faculty); 279 (U.W. Hospitals and
Clinics), 280 (day and home health care providers).
55. While Act 10 permits “public safety officers” to bargain collectively, its defini-
tion of “public safety officer” excludes certain law enforcement officers. For example,
under Act 10, officers employed by the Wisconsin State Capital Police and University of
Wisconsin–Madison Police Department are not considered public safety officers, making
them subject to Act 10. See State Agents, DNR Wardens Not Exempt From Walker Cuts,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/
116502363.html (noting distinction between certain classes of law enforcement officers).
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subject other than “base wages,” which expressly excludes overtime,
premium pay, merit pay, performance pay, supplemental pay, and pay
progressions.56 Furthermore, base wages may not increase more than
the increase in the consumer price index (CPI) as of 180 days before
the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement.57 In many re-
spects, Oklahoma employees have more collective bargaining pro-
tection than Wisconsin employees. Although Oklahoma repealed its
statute that mandated collective bargaining rights in mid-sized muni-
cipalities, it allows collective bargaining at the option of the employer.
In contrast, Wisconsin prohibits collective bargaining even if the em-
ployer is willing to engage in it.58 It is not surprising that Wisconsin
Act 10 repealed the declarations in the Municipal and State Employee
Relations Acts that had found public employee collective bargaining to
be in the public interest.59
B. Limiting the Scope of Bargaining
By far, the most numerous changes made in the upheaval of 2011
concerned the scope of bargaining. Perhaps responding to Wisconsin
Governor Walker’s call to give government managers the tools they
need to improve operations, spur innovation, and control costs,60 legis-
latures have removed, and in many cases prohibited, bargaining over
a wide range of subjects. Some subjects removed from the bargaining
table are directly related to compensation while others deal with work-
ing conditions. Regardless, the legislatures are giving public-sector
employers the tools of command, control, and unilateral imposition.
Health care is the item of compensation most frequently removed
from the bargaining table. Although law enforcement and fire protec-
tion personnel were exempted from Act 10’s prohibition on bargaining
for anything other than base wages, the state’s regular biannual bud-
get act prohibited bargaining over law enforcement and firefighter
56. 2011 Wis. Act 10 § 314.
57. Id. On March 30, 2012, the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Wisconsin upheld the constitutionality of the restricted scope of bargaining
against attacks by a coalition of unions. The unions argued that Act 10’s disparate treat-
ment of most public employees, on the one hand, and security employees on the other,
lacked a rational basis in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and distinguished between employees whose unions had supported Gover-
nor Walker in the 2010 election and those who opposed him, in violation of the First
Amendment. The court did find two other provisions of Act 10 unconstitutional. The
court found that provisions of Act 10 which prohibited voluntary payroll deduction of
union dues for all employees except security employees lacked a rational basis and, thus,
violated the Equal Protection Clause and the requirement that unions representing bar-
gaining units other than security employees submit to annual recertification elections
violated those unions’ and their members’ Equal Protection and Free Speech rights. Wis.
Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, No. 11-cv-428-wmc, 2012 WL 1068790, at *1 (W.D. Wis.
Mar. 30, 2012).
58. 2011 Wis. Act 10 § 169(1m).
59. Id. § 261.
60. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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health insurance.61 Ohio’s enactment deemed “not appropriate” for
bargaining, inter alia, health care benefits, except that the parties
may agree that the employer will pay up to eighty-five percent of the
premiums.62
New Jersey suspended bargaining over health care benefits for
four years while a new statute is phased in. The statute sets a sliding
scale according to salary of mandatory employee contributions to
health care premiums and provides for health care plans to be de-
signed by two state committees, one for education and one for the rest
of the public sector.63
Massachusetts enacted a new method for local governments to
make changes in health insurance. The governing body may adopt
changes in accordance with estimated cost savings and proof of the
savings. It gives notice to each bargaining unit and a retiree represen-
tative. The retiree representative and the bargaining unit represen-
tatives form a public employee committee that negotiates with the
employer for up to thirty days. After thirty days, the matter is sub-
mitted to a tri-partite committee, which, within ten days, can approve
the employer’s proposed changes, reject them, or remand for addi-
tional information. The committee’s decision is final.64
Idaho limited negotiations for teachers to “compensation,” which
it defined as salary and benefits, including insurance, leave time, and
sick leave.65 Previously, bargaining subjects were determined by an
agreement between the parties. The Idaho enactment also limited col-
lective bargaining agreements to one fiscal year, July 1 through June
30, and prohibited evergreen clauses or other provisions that allow a
contract to continue until a new one is reached.66
Similar to Idaho, Indiana limited collective bargaining for tea-
chers to wages and salary and wage-related fringe benefits including
insurance, retirement benefits, and paid time off.67 The statute permits
collective bargaining agreements to have grievance procedures, but de-
letes the prior law’s express authorization for a grievance procedure
61. 2011 Wis. Act 32 § 2409cy.
62. S.B. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.08(B)(2), (E).
63. 2011 N.J. Laws ch. 78.
64. 2011 Mass. Acts, ch. 69. Media reports suggested that in April when the Mas-
sachusetts House passed more restrictive legislation, President Obama’s Director of
Intergovernmental Affairs telephoned Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick with con-
cerns about the bill, which had been strongly opposed by organized labor. The governor
negotiated changes with labor leaders whose attitude changed from a vow to fight the
legislation “to the bitter end” to support and congratulations to the governor for “listen-
ing to labor’s concerns.” See Michael Levenson, National Scrutiny for Mass. Labor Law,
BOS. GLOBE, July 12, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 13742434.
65. S.B. 1108 § 17, 61st Leg. (Idaho 2011).
66. Id. § 22.
67. Senate Enrolled Act No. 575 § 14, 117th Gen. Assemb. (Ind. 2011).
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culminating in binding arbitration.68 The new statute prohibits bar-
gaining on everything else, including express prohibitions on bargain-
ing about the school calendar, teacher dismissal procedures and
criteria, restructuring options, and contracting with an educational
entity that provides post-secondary credits to students.69 It also pro-
hibits any contract that would place a school district in a budgetary
deficit70 and prohibits collective bargaining agreements from extend-
ing beyond the end of the state budget biennium.71 The new law re-
peals a prior provision that authorized parties to agree to arbitrate
teacher dismissals.72
The Indiana enactment provides that the parties shall discuss:
curriculum development and revision; textbook selection; teaching
methods; hiring; evaluation; promotion; demotion; transfer; assign-
ment; retention; student discipline, expulsion, or supervision of stu-
dents; pupil/teacher ratio; class size or budget appropriations; safety
issues; and hours.73 However, any agreements reached in such discus-
sions apparently may not be included in the contract.
In addition to health care benefits, the Ohio enactment deemed
the following inappropriate for collective bargaining: restricting con-
tracting out or providing severance pay to employees whose jobs are
contracted out; granting more than six weeks of vacation, more than
twelve holidays, or more than three personal days; employer contribu-
tions to retirement systems; minimum staffing provisions, class size
and restrictions on school district authority to assign personnel; reduc-
tions in force of educational employees; and seniority as the sole factor
in reductions in force.74
Michigan added to its list of prohibited subjects of bargaining for
educational personnel. Decision and impact bargaining are now pro-
hibited with respect to: placement of teachers; reductions in force and
recalls; performance evaluation systems; the development, content,
standards, procedures, adoption and implementation of a policy regard-
ing employee discharge or discipline; the format, timing and number
of classroom visits; the development, content, standards, procedures,
68. Id. § 17.
69. Id. § 15.
70. Id. § 13.
71. Id. § 16.
72. Id. § 6.
73. Id. § 18.
74. S.B. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 4117.08(B)(4) (contracting out); 4117.105(B) (severance pay to employees whose jobs
have been contracted out); 4117.108(A)(1) (vacation); 4117.108(A)(2)–(3) (holiday and
personal time); 4117.08(B)(3) (employer contribution to the public employees retirement
system); 4117.08(B)(5) (staffing); 4117.081(B)(1) (school district authority to assign);
4117.081(B)(3) (class size); 4117.081(B)(4) (RIF-educational employees); 306.04(B)
(seniority-transit); 709.012 (seniority-firefighters); 3316.07(A)(11) (seniority-nonteaching
school employees).
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adoption and implementation of the method of employee compensation;
decisions about how an employee performance evaluation is used to de-
termine performance-based compensation; and the development, for-
mat, content and procedures of notice to parents and legal guardians of
pupils taught by a teacher who has been rated as ineffective.75
Illinois amended its Educational Labor Relations Act to provide
that, in the Chicago Public Schools, the length of the school day and
the length of the school year are permissive, rather than mandatory,
subjects of bargaining.76 The amendment responded to calls from the
Mayor of Chicago to authorize his appointed school board and manage-
ment team to increase the school day unilaterally in light of the Chi-
cago Teachers Union’s previous refusal to agree to such increases.77
C. Impasse Resolution
Several jurisdictions made major changes to their impasse proce-
dures, significantly increasing employer control over the final terms of
employment. Wisconsin prohibited interest arbitration for all employ-
ees except law enforcement and firefighters.78 Wisconsin now has no
impasse procedures for most public employees. Of course, with bar-
gaining limited to base wages, and further limited to changes in the
CPI, there may not be much need for impasse resolution.
Idaho repealed its requirement of factfinding.79 Under the new
Idaho statute, the parties are authorized, but not required, to mediate
if they have not reached agreement by May 10.80 If they do not reach
agreement by June 10, the school board must unilaterally set the
terms and conditions of employment for the coming school year by
June 22.81 The statute does not expressly restrict the school board’s
actions, thereby leaving open the possibility that the school board
could establish terms never discussed with the union. With evergreen
clauses prohibited, Idaho school boards may be tempted to surface bar-
gain, run out the clock, and unilaterally set terms. It remains to be
seen how closely Idaho courts—Idaho does not have a labor relations
board—will scrutinize employer behavior at the bargaining table.
There is authority in other jurisdictions to deviate from the National
Labor Relations Act’s relatively laissez-faire approach to policing good
faith bargaining.82 Interestingly, the Idaho Supreme Court has held
75. 2011 Mich. Pub. Act 103.
76. S.B. 7 § 10, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2011).
77. See Kristen Mack & Noreen Ahmed-Ullah, Chicago Teachers Union Takes a
Jab at Emanuel, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 7363260.
78. 2011 Wis. Act 10 § 233.
79. S.B. 1108 § 22, 61st Leg. (Idaho 2011).
80. Id. § 20.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Mun. of Metro. Seattle v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 826 P.2d 158,
166 (Wash. 1992) (upholding authority of PERC to impose interest arbitration as a re-
medy for surface bargaining, distinguishing precedent under NLRA on ground that
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that teacher strikes are not automatically enjoinable, with injunction
actions subject to a defense of unclean hands due to bad faith by the
school board in the negotiations process.83 The court assumed, but did
not decide, that teacher strikes were illegal; however, one concurring
justice opined that teacher strikes were lawful because they were not
expressly prohibited.84
Since 1984, Ohio has recognized a right to strike for most public
employees and a right to interest arbitration for the others. Ohio vo-
ters rejected the legislative enactment which would have prohibited
strikes by all public employees and enforced the prohibition with fines
for strikers of two days’ pay for each day on strike, discipline or dis-
charge of strikers, loss of dues checkoff for striking unions, and strike
injunctions.85 The Ohio enactment also would have prohibited interest
arbitration.
In place of strikes and interest arbitration, the Ohio enactment
mandated factfinding if no agreement was reached forty-five days
before scheduled expiration of an existing contract. The enactment
required that the factfinder’s primary consideration be the public
interest and welfare and the employer’s ability to pay. It limited the
factfinder to considering the employer’s financial status as of the time
period surrounding negotiations, precluding consideration of potential
increases in employer revenue or employer ability to sell assets. The
enactment allowed either party by majority vote within fifteen days
following the factfinder’s recommendations to reject them. It required
the Ohio State Employment Relations Board to publicize the rejected
recommendations. Absent agreement within five days after publica-
tion, the parties were to submit their last best offers to the employer’s
legislative body whose chief financial officer would certify which offer
cost more and hold a public hearing. Within fifteen days following con-
tract expiration, the legislative body was to pick one party’s final offer,
with the employer’s offer governing if no selection were made.86
New Jersey and Nevada made significant changes to their interest
arbitration statutes. New Jersey amended its police and firefighter
interest arbitration provisions to eliminate party selection of the arbi-
trator. Now the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC)
randomly selects the arbitrator from a special panel. Additionally, the
parties must present written estimates of the financial impact of their
Washington statute did not provide for a right-to-strike or for a terminal impasse
procedure).
83. Sch. Dist. No. 351 Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Educ. Ass’n, 567 P.2d 830, 835
(Idaho 1977).
84. Id. at 836 (Bakes, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
85. S.B. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. STAT. ANN
§ 4117.12(B)(4).
86. Id. § 4117.14(D)(2).
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final offers, and the award must issue within forty-five days of arbi-
trator appointment (prior law allowed 120 days). The award must
address all statutory criteria and certify that the arbitrator took statu-
tory limitations imposed by the local levy cap into account. The award
may be appealed to PERC, which must: decide the appeal within thirty
days; address all statutory factors; and certify that it took the levy cap
into account. The statute caps arbitrator fees at $1,000 per day and
$7,500 total, and it caps cancellation fees at $500; it fines arbitrators
$1,000 per day for being late. The award may not increase base salary
items by more than two percent of the aggregate amount expended by
the employer in the twelve months immediately preceding expiration
of the prior contract and may not include base salary items and other
economic issues that were not included in prior contract. The cap on
base salaries sunsets on April 1, 2014.87
In Nebraska, the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) per-
forms interest arbitration. The new Nebraska Act provides detailed
criteria for selecting an array of comparable communities and specifies
the number of comparable communities to be selected. It mandates
that if the employer pays compensation that is between 98% and 102%
of the average of the comparables, including fringe benefits, the CIR
must leave compensation unchanged. If the employer’s compensation
is below 98% of the average, the CIR is to raise it to 98%, and if it is
above 102%, the CIR is to lower it to 102%. The targets are reduced to
95–100% during periods of recession, defined as two consecutive quar-
ters in which the state’s net sales, use taxes, and individual and corpo-
rate income tax receipts are below those of the prior year.88
Michigan amended its police and firefighter interest arbitration
statute to provide for final offer issue-by-issue arbitration on economic
issues, with traditional arbitration on other issues. The Michigan en-
actment requires the arbitrator to make the employer’s financial abil-
ity to pay the primary factor.89
Indiana amended its teacher bargaining impasse procedures in a
manner that is most confusing. The Indiana statute provides that
after at least sixty days of bargaining, if impasse is declared, the Indi-
ana Educational Employment Relations Board (IEERB) appoints a
mediator who must conduct not more than three mediation sessions
resulting in either an agreement or each party’s last best offer and fis-
cal rationale.90 If there is no agreement fifteen days after mediation
has ended, the parties proceed to factfinding. One section states that
factfinding must culminate in the factfinder imposing terms,91 but
87. 2010 N.J. Laws ch. 105.
88. L.B. 397, 102d Leg. (Neb. 2011).
89. H.B. 4522, 96th Leg. (Mich. 2011).
90. Senate Enrolled Act No. 575 § 22, 117th Gen. Assemb. (Ind. 2011).
91. Id. § 23.
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another section states that the factfinder issues a report and recom-
mendations to the IEERB, which can add to the recommendations.92
This apparent inconsistency calls out for IEERB clarification.
Illinois modified its law governing strikes in public education. For
school districts other than the Chicago Public Schools, if there is no
agreement within forty-five days of the start of the school year, the Illi-
nois Educational Labor Relations Board must invoke mediation. After
fifteen days of mediation, either party may declare impasse. Seven
days later, each party submits its final offer and cost summary. Seven
days thereafter, the final offers are made public.93 No strike is allowed
until at least fourteen days after publication of final offers.94
For the Chicago Public Schools, if no agreement is reached after a
reasonable period of mediation, the dispute is submitted to factfinding,
upon demand of either party. Factfinding is tri-partite unless the par-
ties agree otherwise. If there is no settlement within seventy-five days,
the factfinder issues a private report with recommendations, which the
parties have fifteen days to reject. If rejected, the recommendations are
made public.95 There may be no strike for thirty days following publica-
tion and no strike unless authorized by seventy-five percent of the bar-
gaining unit members.96
D. Financial Distress
Three states addressed governments experiencing financial dis-
tress. Nevada required contracts to provide for reopening in times of
fiscal emergency.97 The voter-rejected Ohio enactment provided for
modification or termination of contracts if the state placed a local gov-
ernment on fiscal watch or fiscal emergency.98 The most far-reaching
enactment was the Michigan Local Government and School District
Fiscal Accountability Act of 2011.99 It specifies procedures that can
lead to a finding by the state of financial emergency. Upon such a find-
ing, the governor appoints an emergency manager who, among other
things, has the power to reject all or part of a contract upon finding
that: the financial emergency has created a circumstance making it
reasonable and necessary for the state to intervene; the rejection is
reasonable and necessary to deal with a broad, generalized economic
problem; rejection is directly related to and designed to address the
92. Id. § 25.
93. S.B. 7 § 12(a-5), 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2011).
94. Id. § 13(b)(2).
95. Id. § 12(a-10).
96. Id. § 13(b)(2.10).
97. S.B. 98, § 7(2)(w), 76th Leg. (Nev. 2011).
98. S.B. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.104(A).
99. 2011 Mich. Pub. Act. No. 4.
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financial emergency; and rejection is temporary and does not target
specific classes of employees.100
IV. The Future
The future of public-sector collective bargaining laws largely de-
pends on the voters. Whether the Ohio vote marks the start of another
reversal of the pendulum will be tested in Wisconsin where Governor
Walker and four additional Republican Senators now face recall elec-
tions.101 Ultimately, the 2012 elections will likely determine the direc-
tion in which the pendulum will swing.
100. Id.
101. See supra note 5.
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